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6 January 1959

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03000015 **6 JANUARY 1959** I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC II. ASIA-AFRICA UAR fighter aircraft make first use of Sinai airfields. ① Yemen plans renewed guerrilla activity in Western Aden Pro-2 tectorate. Moroccan King issues ultimatum to dissident tribesmen. 3 (3) Laos - Premier postpones assembly session until 10 January to obtain party backing for demand for full **(4)** powers. Indonesia - Premier plans dismissal of several army leaders for (5) corruption. South Korea - Opposition's plans for protest rallies may lead to clash 6 with police. III. THE WEST Cuba - Provisional cabinet contains moderate, responsible elements.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

SIRAB

6 January 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Arab-Israeli situation: Egyptian MIG jet fighters for the first time are operating from two airfields in the Sinai Peninsula. Aircraft from one of the fields, Al-Arish, participated in the clash with Israeli fighters on 23 December.

UAR

NO

and Israeli aircraft are continuing reconnaissance over each other's territory.

Yemen-Aden:

no


Yemen is planning to initiate a new round of anti-British guerrilla activity in the Western Aden Protectorate. The Yemenis probably hope to frustrate British plans to form a federation among the protectorate states.

(Page 1) (Map)

Morocco: King Mohamed V has publicly ordered dissident elements in northern Morocco's Rif, Middle Atlas, and Oujda regions to cease their illegal activities, directed primarily against the dominant Istiqlal party, by noon on 7 January or face disciplinary action by "every means." This suggests the King has reluctantly decided to use recently strengthened and redeployed royal army troops, if necessary, in an effort to head off a major tribal uprising.

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no

Laos: The special assembly session at which Premier Phoui plans to demand full powers has been postponed from 5 to 10 January. Phoui wants to secure his party's support at a 7 January caucus, thus perhaps obviating the need for supporting action by the military. Defense and Interior Minister Katay, who opposes Phoui's plans, remains a possible stumbling block because of his considerable influence in political and military circles in southern Laos.

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of the deputy chiefs of staff and the intelligence chief, will soon be dismissed on corruption charges, according to Premier Djuanda. This could increase army pressures for similar action against civilian officials, including Foreign Minister Subandrio, who are also said to be involved in illegal activities. (Page 3)

South Korea:

the government is continuing its moves to suppress the rising political activity of the Democratic party.

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Democratic plans call for a protest march through Seoul on 7 January, official permission for which has been refused, and an indoor convention on 11 or 12 January, also in Seoul, permission for which is expected to be refused.

(Page 4)

III. THE WEST

*Cuba: Provisional President Manuel Urrutia established himself in the presidential palace in the early evening of 5 January after a delay of several hours caused by a rift between Fidel Castro's 26 of July Movement and another rebel group, the Revolutionary Directorate. The cabinet announced on 3 January, in addition to some political unknowns, contains a number of moderate and responsible elements, including Foreign Minister Roberto Agramonte, who is a leading political and intellectual figure considered friendly to the US and anti-Communist.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Fidel Castro has often asserted his desire to keep Cuba friendly to the US; his recent statements do not call for the nationalization of foreign investments as did his 1955 pledges. However, old-line politicians such as former President Prio, as well as some irresponsible elements in the 26 of July Movement, will add to the difficulties of forming a stable government. (Page 5)

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
DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up Material

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Yemen-Aden Developments
Yemen plans to begin a new phase of anti-British guerrilla activity in the Western Aden Protectorate. The impetus to incite new dissidence probably stems in large part from Yemen's desire to frustrate British plans to form a federation among the principal states of the Western Protectorate.
the move- ment of arms and funds to Yemeni officials on the frontier, presumably for distribution among dissident Protectorate sheiks.
tion would seek to "cut land communications between Aden and Dhala," seat of an emirate on the Protectorate side of
the border.
Yemen may also attempt to carry out terrorism in Aden Colony.
Yemeni officials have been strongly opposed to London's project for federation of the states of the Western Protectorate, because they fear it is intended to prolong British influence and strengthen the ability of the weak Protectorate states to resist Yemeni encroachment.



Yemen is ambitious to annex Aden Protectorate and Colony, while the British hope to promote an independent and friendly federation of Protectorate states as a buffer between Yemen and Aden Colony, Britain's main military base in the Arabian Peninsula, and the world's greatest oil-bunkering port.

The six principal Protectorate rulers have been meeting in Aden Colony with British officials to work out arrangements for establishing a federation government. The rulers, who are reported to be apathetic on all questions of constitutional detail except the level of their remuneration, want to retain their individual treaty ties with Britain, although London would continue to control the defense and foreign affairs of the proposed federation. London hopes to inaugurate the federation by April of this year.

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High Indonesian Army Officers May Be Dismissed in Barter Scandals

Prime Minister Djuanda has informed the American ambassador that the army will soon dismiss four colonels, including the army intelligence chief and a deputy chief of staff, who have been involved in "barter scandals." The four officers have been found guilty of abusing their position by engaging in illegal barter trade. Seven other officers—two majors and five colonels—will be court—martialed,

Djuanda also told the ambassador that the government plans to continue its investigation of corruption among government officials. This statement may indicate that Army Chief of Staff General Nasution has succeeded in persuading Djuanda to move against corrupt civil officials in return for Nasution's action against his officers. Civil officials involved in illegal activities reportedly include Foreign Minister Subandrio.

Principal pressure for action against the army has come from the National and Communist parties. The cabinet seems likely to consider this question this week, and it is possible that with action against civil officials in view, some compromise will be reached that will mitigate the punishment of the four colonels. Soft-pedaling the issue would avoid giving the Communists an opportunity to claim joint responsibility for a campaign against the army and corruption.	

Tension Rising in South Korea

The South Korean Government is continuing energetic
measures to limit the effectiveness of efforts by the op-
position Democratic party to nullify recent amendments
to the National Security Law.
all South Korean police have been alerted
to carry out a strict and secret investigation of the
Democratic party's efforts to gain public support for
petitions opposing the law. In addition, the police have
been instructed to tear down posters and banners printed
by the so-called 'Struggle Committee for Opposition to
the Revision of the National Security Law."
The opposition Democrats have been refused official permission to march in protest through Seoul on 7 January. They are planning an indoor protest meeting with representatives from all over the country for 11 or 12 January, but this will probably also be prohibited. If the Democrats decide to proceed with their plans, violence and bloodshed could result.

III. THE WEST

The Cuban Situation

Provisional President Manuel Urrutia established himself in the presidential palace in the early evening of 5 January after a delay of several hours caused by a rift between Fidel Castro's 26 of July Movement and another rebel group, the Revolutionary Directorate. The latter apparently had attempted to use its temporary occupation of the presidential palace to extract concessions from the dominant 26 of July Movement in the organization of the new government. The difficulties of forming a stable government will be added to by old-line politicians such as former President Prio, as well as by irresponsible elements in the 26 of July Movement.

The cabinet named by Urrutia on 3 January contains a number of moderate and responsible members, including Foreign Minister Roberto Agramonte. Agramonte is a leading political and intellectual figure and former presidential candidate who is believed friendly to the United States. There are also some political unknowns in the cabinet.

Thus far there have been only a few indications of the policies to be followed by the new government. Fidel Castro has often asserted his desire to keep Cuba friendly to the US. Although in 1955 he pledged to nationalize foreign investments and public utilities, his statements since the fall of Batista do not call for such action. The new government may seek a revision of the lease agreement for the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay and an increase in the annual rent of the equivalent of \$2,000 in gold coin.

On 5 January, V	enezuela became the first	nation to		
recognize the new Co	uban Government, which is	almost cer-		
tain to be an aggress	sive champion of democracy	y in the hemi-		
sphere. Urrutia's inaugural speech contained references to				
the people of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Para-				
guay who are still to				
	instructing fo	ormer gun-		
runners for the rebel movement to stop all shipments to Cuba, states: "Cuba does not need arms, but there are still dictator-				
ships in America.''				
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THE PRESIDENT

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Special Adviser to the President

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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